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D o s s i e r
Project Stormfury was among the most prominent 
weather modiication programs of the 20th Cen-
tury. Running from 1962 to 1983, it had a brief 
moment of glory in 1969. In that year, Hurricane 
Debbie was “seeded” ive times : the clouds were 
sprinkled with silver iodide crystals released from 
air planes. The experiments seemingly succeeded 
in reducing wind speeds, and moreover, the good 
results were conirmed by a computer simulation 
model developed at Stormfury, at the time one 
of the most advanced of its kind. But in 1983, 
the developer of the model, Stanley Rosenthal, 
conceded that predicting the outcome of seeding 
experiments was theoretically not possible. In 
retrospect, he deemed the strange behaviour of 
the hurricane Debbie as the result of its natural 
evolution.1
Very many weather modiication projects were 
in operation during the period that Stormfury 
ran, ranging from very big to very small, with 
projects beneitting from US government support 
and large scale funding from the NSF to small 
commercial projects. Stormfury itself received 
support from the Navy. It was, among other 
things, a typical Cold War project. At the other 
end of the scale, commercial weather modiica-
tion dealt with the complexities of the atmosphere 
and uncertainties about the effects of interven-
tion, too. Usually, cloud seeding irms operated 
in a straightforward fashion, on a “no cure, no 
pay” basis. Only if there was rain after the cloud 
seeding operation, the drought stricken farmer 
would pay. But there were cases where instead 
of beneicial rain a devastating lood was pro-
duced. When taken to court, however, the cloud 
seeders would invariably make the case that the 
atmosphere was far too complex to establish a 
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relationship between the seeding and the disaster. 
Usually, their argument was accepted. 
With these experiences in mind, it seems aston-
ishing that weather modiication has returned 
on a much grander scale : climate manipulation, 
usually called geoengineering. Since around 
2005, several dozens of scientific teams are 
investigating a variety of geoengineering tech-
niques and the US National Academy and the 
UK Royal Society have issued reports in which 
they advocate research into geoengineering.2 
Paul Crutzen, the renowned climate scientist and 
Nobel Prize winner, advocated that humankind 
should get prepared to blast enormous quantities 
of sulphate particles into the stratosphere.3 This 
would produce a global cooling effect, if urgently 
needed, similar to the (temporary) cooling of 
large vulcano eruptions. If this seems science 
iction and at any rate far away in the future, other 
forms of geoengineering are closer to application 
in the real world. A series of smaller scale experi-
ments involving so-called ocean fertilization have 
already been carried out. Adding iron or another 
nutrient to the ocean would cause algal bloom, 
thereby taking up carbondioxide from the atmo-
sphere. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
has taken steps toward a ban on large scale open 
ocean experiments of this kind, for reasons to be 
discussed below.
The reason to engage in geoengineering seems 
simple : climate change is happening and the 
world does not succeed in curbing carbondioxide 
emissions. Quite the contrary in fact. Perhaps in a 
few decades from now, the world will experience 
an average rise of temperature of more than 2o C, 
a igure which is generally acknowledged to cause 
important and irreversible dangers. Something 
must be done. But why get involved in geoengi-
neering ? Is there any reason to suppose that the 
lessons from Stormfury will not apply to climate 
manipulation ? Compared to 1983, we have 
hugely more data on the atmosphere and hugely 
more computer capacity. But the understanding 
of the complexity of large natural systems has 
hardly progressed in the same manner. Insofar it 
has, the study of complexity has given us much 
more insight in the inherently unstable nature of 
large natural systems and of their “jumpiness”, 
their capacity to react very strongly on a com-
paratively tiny change in one of the variables in 
its environment. In an optimistic note, climate 
scientists note that the global climate responds 
more linearly to changes of atmospheric variables 
than the (local) weather. But nobody lives in the 
global climate. Global climatic change translates 
very differently to different regional climates, in 
a non-linear and hence unpredictable fashion.
In its 2009 Report, the Royal Society has ac-
knowledged considerations of this kind and has 
nevertheless taken the stand that geoengineer-
ing should be taken very seriously. The Report 
is a landmark report on several accounts. It is a 
systematic and critical evaluation of all the geo-
engineering proposals that have been made in the 
past decade. It charts the uncertainties around the 
various interventions in the climate, to several of 
which it takes a very critical stance. It addresses 
the ‘governance’ issues around geoengineering, 
i.e. the social and political conditions for any 
larger scale intervention in nature in a more 
sophisticated way than several predecessors, 
and it invited a panel of ethicists to comment on 
geoengineering issues. But one remark towers 
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over and above all kinds of cautionary stands 
the Royal Society is taking : “Why should ap-
propriate geoengineering options not be added 
to the portfolio of options of dealing with climate 
change ?” It also has a key recommendation : 
“.... Solar Radiation Management methods may 
provide a potentially useful short-term backup 
to mitigation in case rapid reductions in global 
temperatures are needed.” The Report also says 
that “...Geoengineering is likely to be technically 
feasible, and could substantially reduce the costs 
and risks of climate change.” It is not, therefore, 
an option of last resort.4 With the Report, the 
Royal Society is the irst public institution of 
high authority to throw its weight behind climate 
manipulation. In fairness to the RS, it should be 
pointed out that it does not advocate geoengineer-
ing as an alternative to greenhouse gas reduction 
(in contrast to, for instance, Newt Gingrich, a 
Republican candidate to the US Presidency and 
former climate sceptic, who sees geoengineering 
as a welcome alternative to the curbing of carbon 
dioxide emissions). But the RS considerably 
raised the stature of geoengineering, which was 
considered by many as close to science iction.
The geoengineering techniques evaluated by 
the Royal Society
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) is one of 
the two categories in which all geoengineer-
ing techniques can be divided, according to the 
RS’s overview, the other being Carbon Dioxide 
Removal (CDR). The latter approaches global 
warming abatement by its root cause. If this 
makes it by far the most preferred, CDR has two 
disadvantages : it will take considerable time to 
sort out effect, and while most CDR techniques 
seem to be technically feasible in the short run, 
the necessary scaling-up of the techniques will 
pose many technical and governance problems. 
One CDR technique is uncontested and already 
agreed upon internationally : afforestation, re-
forestation and avoidance of deforestation. But 
there are several more, all in an embryonic stage. 
The furthest developed, as already mentioned, is 
ocean fertilization. Risks of unanticipated envi-
ronmental effects are evaluated as high in the RS 
Report. Ocean fertilization is a form of intention-
ally changing marine ecosystems, with all kinds 
of known and unknown dangers to biodiversity, 
while poisoning of remote areas may be among 
the possible outcomes, due to the transportation 
by ocean currents of the dying algae. Not only is 
the eficiency of ocean fertilization probably low, 
but it would also not be easily veriiable given the 
complexity of the large marine ecosystems.5 “It is 
hard to tell whether [the fertilization mechanisms] 
are working or not”. On top of that, the RS Report 
notes, the technique is very risky and “there are 
likely to be unintended and probably deleterious 
ecological consequences.” Despite these judg-
ments, the RS Report suggests that a moratorium 
is not a good idea, as it would hamper research. 6
The International Oceanographic Commis-
sion (IOC), an organization which forms part 
of UNESCO, likewise does not endorse ocean 
fertilization. A report commissioned by the IOC 
states that “we rarely understand the factors 
and mechanisms that cause large-scale, natural 
regime shifts within marine ecosystems”.7 But 
ocean fertilization does have partisans within 
the scientiic community and a California-based 
company, Climos, expresses interest in develop-
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ing ocean fertilization commercially. (Its business 
model is based on expected inancial compensa-
tion for earning carbon credits in the regulatory 
environmental markets, on the assumption that 
society would be willing to allow ocean fertiliza-
tion).8 Rock star Neil Young is also enthusiastic 
about ocean fertilization and he offered the yacht 
he owns in Hawaii for carrying out fertilization 
experiments. The proposals have met with sharp 
criticism in the scientiic literature, in which it 
is pointed out that commercial parties might be 
dificult to restrain once they get in for proit.9
CDR methods of which the risks are estimated 
as “medium” are biochar (charcoal) production 
and other forms of biomass sequestration. The 
RS Report is rather reluctant about these tech-
niques. While they may yield signiicant small 
scale contributions, the RS fears that they might 
become competitors to food crops, in a manner 
similar to biofuels.10
One new CDR technique does get an approval 
from the RS : “enhanced weathering” (on land, 
not in the ocean). The idea is based on the obser-
vation that the weathering of rocks involves the 
capture of carbondioxide. Normally, however, 
this is an extremely slow process taking aeons, 
since only the surface of rocks is exposed to the 
air. “Enhancing” the weathering process would 
involve mining and grounding of rocks and 
spreading the resultant powdered materials over 
ields, where it would have a fertilizing effect. 
According to the RS Report, “Enhanced weather-
ing is expected to be reasonably effective”, and 
it is placed in the low risk category with respect 
to unintended consequences. The foreseeable en-
vironmental impact would be similar to conven-
tional coal mining and cement production.11 The 
RS Report does not give estimates of the scale 
which would be needed for this operation, other 
than noting that it would be “large”, and “likely 
to damage the environment locally over large 
areas”. When we also take into consideration 
that the technical problems of weathering are far 
from solved (one of them being that the chemical 
reactions involved in weathering produce heat), 
the overall judgment of the RS Report seems 
much too positive.
The various Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
techniques, the second major class of climate 
manipulation methods, should have stayed in the 
science iction category. Take the idea of install-
ing in space, 1.5 million kilometers from the Earth 
where the gravitational ields of the Sun and the 
Earth are in balance, a layer of relecting disks 
fabricated in space from near-Earth asteroids. Or 
“hanging” there a superine mesh of aluminium 
threads. The RS Report does not want to “dismiss 
them from future consideration”.12 Reducing solar 
radiation does not attack global warming in its 
root cause. Compared to the CDR techniques, 
their main advantage is that once put into place 
they would work fast, on a timescale of years 
instead of decades. But they would require deve-
lopment time, which the RS estimates at several 
decades. Given the nature of these techniques 
as totally last-resort, when-all-else-fails, who is 
going to initiate them and pay for their develop-
ment ? Edward Teller is the originator of several 
SRM ideas. At one point, Teller was able to con-
vince President Reagan to embark on the Strategic 
Defence Initiative (Star Wars). But he died in 
2003. Is there a scientist to take his place ?
One candidate is Paul Crutzen. As mentioned, 
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in 2006 Crutzen adopted and developed one of 
Teller’s ideas : blasting aerosols in the strato-
sphere. It received much attention. The attrac-
tiveness of the stratospheric aerosols proposal 
comes from the analogy with volcanic eruptions. 
Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991. In the two fol-
lowing years, there was a marked cooling effect, 
globally. The artiicial injections would simply 
mimic a natural occurrence. The aerosol method 
seems to have three advantages : the mechanism 
is simple compared to, for instance, interventions 
in marine ecosystems; delivery in the upper lay-
ers of the atmosphere requires just airplanes or 
rockets; costs are estimated as tens of billions of 
dollars. The RS concludes that of all the SRM 
methods “stratospheric aerosols appear to be 
the most promising”. Even though it notes that 
signiicant further research is needed on adverse 
effects, this judgment is, again, surprisingly posi-
tive.13 As noted in the RS report, the Pinatubo 
eruption caused a reduction of the ozone layer, 
and this is also one of the potential negative side 
effects of stratospheric aerosols. Not noted in 
the RS report, however, is the fate of the aerosol 
particles which would come down and pollute 
the environment. Possible differences in regional 
impact are noted, but are not emphasized at all. 
They may, however, turn out to be dramatic : the 
Asian Monsoon might become disrupted, with 
catastrophic consequences for agriculture in the 
region. Wide disagreements between Northern 
and Southern countries on the application of the 
technique can be expected.14 
Evaluating the Royal Society evaluating the 
various geoengineering techniques, we ind that 
the Report does contain a number of cautionary 
observations but omits quite a few that it could 
and should have discussed. Moreover, the Report 
displays a “can do” mentality, even in science 
iction cases, which apparently the humanities 
scholars on the working group have not been 
able to contain within proper bounds. This 
raises a question : to what extent does the Report 
voices the opinion of the scientiic community on 
global warming abatement ? Is the Royal Society 
“speaking in the name of science” ? According to 
historian James Fleming it does not in this case. 
A survey of recent pronunciations on the subject 
makes this clear. And neither, according to Flem-
ing, is there much public support for large-scale 
interventions in the Earth’ natural systems.15 A 
year prior to the release of the Report, the Royal 
Society published a special issue of its Philo-
sophical Transactions which, on issues such as 
ocean fertilization, was far more uncritically 
supportive than the Report. Some of the authors 
in Transactions, such as Ken Caldeira, a known 
protagonist of SRM, and Brian Launder, came 
to serve as members of the RS working group. 
On their topics, the Report spoke favourably.16 
The Royal Society may have accidently brought 
together a group of partisan scientists. Yet, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that Crutzen did 
rally an important number of scientists around the 
idea of SRM. This, at least, is the impression of 
Steve Rayner, the STS scholar who served on the 
Royal Society’s working group which prepared 
the Report.17
 
The governance of geoengineering the cli-
mate : Will principles sufice ?
To the Royal Society Report’s credit, it should 
be said that it devoted a large section to issues 
of governance of geoengineering. What are the 
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social and political conditions for engaging with 
it ? Do we have opt-out possibilities once we 
decided to go for it ? Do regulatory gaps exist ? 
Is the public and is civil society suficiently en-
gaged ? These are among the important questions 
that the Report raises. 
Yet the RS Report has a reassuring tone : issues 
and concerns must be raised, but with proper 
governance frameworks, governments and in-
tergovernmental bodies will be able to make 
reasonable and responsible decisions, informed 
by public dialogue and underpinned by the latest 
available scientiic evidence. The “technology 
control dilemma” is referred to as a central prob-
lem for geoengineering as an emerging technol-
ogy. Too little is known about the consequences 
of geoengineering, which precludes anticipating 
and controlling undesirable side-effects. 
An answer to this dilemma has been “risk assess-
ment”. This is an insuficient answer, according 
to the RS Report, since indeterminacy and igno-
rance prevail and unintended consequences may 
be unavoidable. The “precautionary principle” 
emerged as a way to deal with decisionmaking 
under conditions of ignorance. The Report notes 
that a moratorium is a possible answer, and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity actually 
took steps toward a moratorium, irst on ocean 
fertilization and, with the Conference Of Parties 
10 X/33 decision, on any geoengineering activity 
which has effects on biodiversity. The 2008 mora-
torium pronounced that no ocean fertilization 
should take place before risks had been assessed 
and proper global control and regulation were in 
place. An exception was made for small-scale 
scientiic studies within coastal waters. Com-
mercial ocean fertilization was ruled out.18 In 
January 2009, one ocean fertilization experiment 
was temporarily suspended, but after environ-
mental assessments were made the experiment 
was allowed after all. Conducted by the German 
Alfred Wegener Institute in the Southern Ocean, 
controversy over the experiment had arisen about 
its classiication as a ‘small scale scientiic experi-
ment’.19 According to its opponents, it classiied 
as geo-engineering. It was at any rate the largest 
experiment since ocean fertilization experiments 
started in 1993 : 10 tonnes of iron sulfate were 
released on a patch of 300 km2. Probably in the 
context of the controversy over this experiment, 
the RS Report inds that a moratorium is not a 
good idea, because it would inhibit research. It 
would be preferable to build a responsible inter-
national research community. 
The precautionary principle is given credit as a 
guiding principle, but it is noted that this prin-
ciple is interpreted in widely varying ways. In 
the end, it is up to societal actors to negotiate 
what precaution means, and it will be a matter 
of weighing concerns about the consequences 
of climate change on the one hand and concerns 
about side-effects of geoengineering techniques 
on the other. 
In connection with the control dilemma, problems 
of irreversibility are discussed, too. There is 
reason to fear that, once certain steps have been 
taken, it will be dificult to retreat. These pro-
blems are to be dealt with by assessing the degree 
of technical reversibility of the different options 
and by paying attention to developing social and 
economic irreversibilities caused by investments 
and vested interests. 
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Despite a number of reservations, Rayner is an 
advocate of “upstream” societal engagement with 
emerging technologies and unorthodox ways of 
climate change abatement. After the completion 
of the RS Report, he went on to with elaborating 
draft principles for geoengineering governance. 
The ive ‘Oxford principles’ on geoengineering 
as the memorandum to the House of Commons 
came to be called, are the fruit of labour of a 
team headed by Rayner, with four other scholars 
with backgrounds in international laws, ethics, 
risk management and geoengineering.20 Now 
endorsed by the UK parliament, British research-
ers are being requested to adopt the principles as 
their code of conduct.
Will the world be a better place now ? The Ox-
ford principles formulate rules, in very general 
terms, on public engagement, transparency, risk 
assessment and robust governance frameworks. 
Terms as “informed consent” have a legal ring 
taken from internationally binding trading agree-
ments on potentially harmful products21, while 
“public good” seems too weak a concept when 
commercial parties are allowed to earn carbon 
points in the context of international agreements. 
An underlying theory of democratic gover-
nance of technology can be vaguely discerned : 
science and technology are a public good, the 
risks and beneits of which should be assessed and 
regulated in an open and independent way with 
which the public should engage “upstream”, pay-
ing attention to a wide range of risks, including 
technical, environmental, social and economic, 
so as to mitigate undesirable irreversibilities. In 
a more recent contribution, Rayner invokes a 
“geo-engineering paradox” : the technology that 
seems to be nearest to maturity (aerosol seeding) 
is the most dificult to implement from a social 
and political perspective, and vice versa. 
The RS Report’s discussion of governance was 
the irst governance framework for geoengineer-
ing, though not for related issues. The moratorium 
on ocean fertilization was agreed on in 2008, 
and the London Convention 1972 and London 
Protocol 1996 to which it referred served as a 
framework to prevent marine pollution through 
dumping of waste. The Science and Implemen-
tation Plan of the Earth System Governance 
Project of the International Human Dimensions 
Programme on Global Environmental Change 
(IHDP-GEC), which was inished in 2009 after 
ive years of consultations, does not devote a 
single word to geoengineering.22 That said, the 
plan offers ample space for addressing issues of 
geoengineering governance. It has four cross-cut-
ting research themes : power, knowledge, norms 
and scale. It put problems of justice, legitimacy, 
and accountability on the agenda; the plan also 
builds on Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
research.23 Questions around “the intersection 
of power and knowledge and how this shapes 
the way Earth system challenges are framed and 
potential policy response agendas set” seem as 
pertinent for geoengineering governance to ask 
as for other Earth governance issues.24 
This is a research agenda to which Rayner has 
amply contributed. We should acknowledge that 
power relations are fully at work in the framing 
of problems and solutions and that rhetorics of 
principles and codes of conduct say little about 
the sociomaterial practices on the ground (or in 
the ocean, or the sky for that matter). Rayner can-
not be content with principles. Principles come 
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with idealistic accounts of democracy. Building 
on pragmatist accounts of democracy, Noortje 
Marres has argued that democratic politics and 
the governance of risk involves articulation of 
“issues” by societal actors, rather than principles 
and procedures for public participation in deci-
sionmaking.25 When ignorance prevails, existing 
institutions are unable to resolve issues, partly 
because it is unclear who will be affected by the 
consequences of decisions and in what ways. 
Under those circumstances, it is up to citizens 
to engage themselves with an issue beyond 
the procedural settings of decisionmaking, and 
articulate its many sides. As issue articulation is 
not geared towards consensual decisonmaking, 
it renders explicit irreconcilable framings and 
ways of engaging with the world, which may 
amount to incommensurable worldviews and 
worldmakings. These antagonisms are a valuable 
and inevitable aspect of issues going “public”. 
Issue articulation, then, is a dynamic process. 
It may undergo shifts, sometimes radical shifts, 
through the way problems are framed by the 
various participants, and draw in new partici-
pants and institutions. One example is the public 
debate on genetically modiied crops in France.26 
In 1986, GM crop research was framed around 
the notion of “innovation”. Research funding 
for innovation in genetic modiication was made 
available, providing ample space for the setting 
up of (laboratory) experiments. A few years later, 
EU regulation made risk assessment mandatory. A 
distinction between experimental and commercial 
releases became accepted in France (at the EU 
level a proposed moratorium was rejected by one 
vote). This distinction would determine a shift in 
the conceptualization of “experiments”.
The expert committee advising the French 
government argued that contained ield experi-
ments were needed to ind out about possible 
risks. Around 1993, experts began to argue that 
risks could only be accurately evaluated in large-
scale ield trials. These were allowed as a new 
category under the condition of being monitored. 
In 1996, population biologists – who saw expert 
committees dominated by molecular biologists – 
called for a moratorium on commercial releases, 
while environmentalists continued to emphasize 
“risks”. A few years after, farmers organiza-
tions and activists started to destroy ield trials, 
justifying the demolition as “a legitimate act of 
precaution”. In their view, the ield trials served 
the interests of the agro-food industry. Further 
development of GMOs, they argued, would bring 
increased monopolization and commodifica-
tion of seeds. In court cases, judges agreed that 
destruction of ield trials could be legitimate and 
not illegal.
In the case of geoengineering, articulation of 
issues outside scientiic circles has started rela-
tively recently. Public debate became pronounced 
only after the Royal Society issued its Report. 
Some of the dynamics of articulation of indi-
vidual geoengineering techniques like ocean iron 
fertilization are remarkably similar to those of the 
GM case discussed above. There is a push for 
scaling up experiments by scientiic-commercial 
consortia while the distinction between scientiic 
experiments and deployment has been called 
into question.27 The dominant risk assessment 
framing is being challenged. Given this context, 
the central message of the RS Society Report, that 
research on geoengineering should be promoted, 
QUADERNI N°76 - AUTOMNE 2011 ENGINEERING THE PLANET .87
is not as innocent as it seems. 
The lesson of project Stormfury and other 
weather modiication projects in the 1960s and 
1970s is that little can be taken for granted about 
knowledge claims, interpretive lexibility of prin-
ciples and the strategies of private companies. 
There is certainly no reason to ask fewer ques-
tions about Earth politics. When oceanographers 
note that “[d]espite these uncertainties in the 
science, private organizations are making plans 
to conduct larger-scale iron releases to gener-
ate carbon offsets” and “ield studies on larger 
spatial and longer timescales” as part of targeted 
reasearch programmes “to reduce uncertainties”, 
thereby challenging the ban on ocean fertilization, 
it is time to question the practices going on under 
the label of geoengineering governance.28
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Le rapport de la Royal Society intitulé Geoengineering 
the Climate, publié en 2009, marque une étape cruciale 
à divers titres. Cette contribution propose une évalua-
tion critique de différentes techniques de geoenginee-
ring que la Royal Society considère, dans ce rapport, 
comme susceptibles de contribuer à la réduction du 
réchauffement global. Elles peuvent être regroupées 
en deux grandes catégories : les techniques de gestion 
des radiations solaire, et celles de retrait de dioxyde 
de carbone. La Royal Society propose également un 
cadre de gouvernance pour guider la recherche future 
ainsi que l’application des techniques de geoenginee-
ring. Basés sur ce cadre, des principes dits « Principes 
d’Oxford » ont été formulés. Ils articulent des règles 
en des termes très généraux autour de l’engagement 
public, la transparence, l’évaluation des risques et les 
cadres d’une gouvernance robuste du geoengineering. 
Dans cette contribution, nous défendons l’idée que ces 
principes ne sont pas sufisants pour aborder les ini-
tiatives actuelles dans le domaine du geoengineering. 
Les irmes privées encouragent les études sur le terrain 
à de larges échelles de temps et d’espace, qui battent 
en brèche le moratoire proposé par la Convention sur 
la Diversité Biologique. Maintenant que la distinction 
entre expérimentation scientifique et déploiement 
grandeur nature est mise en question, il convient de 
réexaminer les pratiques regroupées sous le label de 
gouvernance du geoengineering et d’appeler à un large 
débat public sur ces questions scientiiques.
Abstract
The Royal Society report on Geoengineering the 
Climate, published in 2009, is a landmark report 
on several accounts. This article assesses critically 
a number of the geoengineering techniques, in the 
broad categories of Solar Radiation Management and 
Carbon Dioxide Removal, which the Royal Society 
considers as candidate technologies for global warm-
ing abatement. The Royal Society also proposed a 
governance framework to guide future research on and 
application of geoengineering techniques. Building on 
this framework, the so-called Oxford Principles were 
derived. The Oxford Principles formulate rules, in very 
general terms, on public engagement, transparency, 
risk assessment and robust governance frameworks 
with respect to geoengineering. In this article, it is 
argued that principles are not adequate to deal with 
ongoing initiatives in the ield of geoengineering. 
Private organizations are pushing for ield studies on 
larger spatial and longer timescales and thereby chal-
lenge a moratorium proposed by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Now that the distinction between 
scientiic experiments and deployment has been called 
into question, the practices going on under the label of 
geoengineering governance need to be reexamined and 
recognized as broad public-scientiic issues.
Mots-clefs : geoengineering, évaluation des risques, 
gouvernance, expérimentation scientifique, débat 
public.
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